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Abstract 
A recurring theme in commentary on parliamentary (Lok Sabha) elections in India 
since the 1990s is that of “anti-incumbency”: at every election since 1991, voters have 
cut a swathe through incumbent members of parliament by choosing to replace a large 
number of them with a fresh set of faces. In this paper we make more precise the 
concept of  “anti-incumbency” and then, based on this concept, we measure the extent 
of anti-incumbency, in the 10 Indian parliamentary general elections between 1967 
and 1999, towards the historically most significant of political parties in India - the 
Indian National Congress (INC). In addition, we examine the electoral performance of 
the INC in its marginal constituencies both as an incumbent and as non-incumbent.  
Lastly, we examine the effectiveness of vote mobilisation by the INC in 
constituencies in which it was the incumbent and in constituencies in which it was not 
the incumbent.  Based on all these approaches, we find little evidence of incumbency 
bias against the INC.  
                                                 
*
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1. Introduction 
A major issue in the study of elections is whether, and to what extent, the chances 
of a candidate or a party being elected from a constituency are improved or damaged 
by virtue of the fact that the candidate or the party is the incumbent in that 
constituency (i.e. won the previous election from that constituency).  The literature on 
US elections suggests that incumbents enjoy considerable advantage over their non-
incumbent rivals: they are not only much more likely to be re-elected (Lee, 2001) but 
their margin of victory has increased significantly over time (Alford and Hibbing, 
1981; Collie, 1981; Garland and Gross, 1984).  By contrast, a recurring theme in the 
literature on parliamentary (Lok Sabha) elections in India since the 1990s is that of 
“anti-incumbency”: at every election since 1991, voters have cut a swathe through 
incumbent members of parliament by choosing to replace a large number of them 
with a fresh set of faces.   
The “anti-incumbency” sentiment of Indian voters in a particular constituency 
may be underpinned by any one of four “grievances”: (i) at its broadest, it may 
represent a vote against the ruling party at the centre (“national government 
incumbency”); (ii) more narrowly, but still within the purview of a ruling party, it 
may represent a vote against the party of government in the state in which the 
constituency is based (“state government incumbency”); (iii) it may represent a vote 
against the party which won the seat in the previous election, regardless of whether 
that party forms the government at the centre or in the state (“party incumbency”); 
(iv) at its narrowest, it may represent a vote against the sitting member of parliament 
(“candidate incumbency”).   
We define incumbency in this paper in terms of the party which won a 
constituency in the previous election (“party incumbency”) and an anti-incumbent 
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vote is, therefore, a vote against the incumbent party.  The issue of “government 
incumbency” (Yadav, 2004) or “candidate incumbency” (see Linden, 2003) are not 
addressed in this paper.  Within this context, we make more precise the concept of  
“anti-incumbency” and then, based on this concept, we measure the extent of anti-
incumbency towards the Indian National Congress
1
 (INC).   
To students of Indian politics this party needs no introduction.  For others, the 
INC (which was the party of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru) was India’s 
party of government in five successive parliamentary elections: 1951, 1957, 1962, 
1967, and 1971.  After a brief period out of power, following the 1977 elections, it 
stormed back winning the next two elections (1980 and 1984) handsomely.  Since the 
1996 elections, however, it has had to sit on the Opposition benches and it was only 
after the most recent (2004) elections that it  was again able to form a government but 
in coalition with other parties and supported, from outside government, by the 
Communists.    
We also examine the electoral performance of the INC in its marginal 
constituencies both as an incumbent and as non-incumbent.  Lastly, we examine the 
effectiveness of vote mobilisation by the INC in constituencies in which it was the 
incumbent and in constituencies in which it was not the incumbent.  We place these 
results in a comparative context by presenting equivalent results for India’s other 
major party: the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP).  
The results presented in this paper are based on parliamentary election outcomes 
in every constituency in the 16 major states of India (and Delhi) for each of the 11 
Lok Sabha General Elections between 1962 and 1999
2
.  A major problem in using the 
                                                 
1
 Commonly referred to as the Congress Party or, simply, as the Congress. 
2
 Because of disturbances in these states, parliamentary (Lok Sabha) elections for Punjab and Assam 
could not be conducted as part of the 1984 parliamentary General Election;  instead they were held in 
1985.  They are included here as part of the 1984 election results.  Similarly, results for the 
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data was tracking the results for each constituency over the different elections.  This 
task was made difficult by inconsistencies in the spelling of constituency names over 
the period: for example, sometimes it was “Behrampore” and at other times 
“Behrampur”.  In order to correct these anomalies, we examined each constituency, 
across every election, to arrive at a consistent set of electoral data for 1962-1999.
3
                        
2.  Analysing the "Incumbency Effect" 
Let  and A A  denote, respectively, the events that a political party won or lost  
the previous election from a constituency (i.e. is/is not the incumbent party in that 
constituency) and let T and T  denote, respectively, the events that the party wins or 
loses the current election from that constituency. Then, the probability that the party 
wins/loses the current election in the constituency, given that it is the incumbent party 
in that constituency is: ( | ) and ( | )P T A P T A  and one definition of the risk ratio 
associated with being the incumbent is: 
( | )
( | )
P T A
P T A
  . 
The risk ratio measures the odds of the null hypothesis being “true” (the party 
wins the current election from a constituency) to it being “false” (the party loses the 
current election from the constituency) under a particular set of data (the party is the 
incumbent party in the constituency).   
An alternative view of the risk of a party winning/losing from a constituency, 
in which it is the incumbent, is provided by posing the following question: given two 
rival scenarios – in the first, a party is the incumbent; in the second, it is a challenger - 
what is the ratio of its probabilities of winning that seat in these different situations?  
In order to answer this question, the relevant “risk ratio” is 
( | )
( | )
P T A
P T A
  : given two 
                                                                                                                                            
parliamentary (Lok Sabha) elections in Punjab held in 1992 – which, but for disturbances in this state, 
would have been part of the 1991 General Election – are included in the 1991 election results. 
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different “pieces” of information – a party is the incumbent or a challenger – what is 
the ratio of its probabilities of winning the election?  
3.  Risk Ratio and Odds Ratio Calculations for Indian Parliamentary 
(Lok Sabha) Elections  
Table 1 shows the “incumbency outcomes” for the seats contested by the INC 
in the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi for the 10 successive parliamentary (Lok 
Sabha) General Elections in India from 1967 to 1999.  This Table shows, for example, 
that in 1999 the INC won in 50, and lost in 80, constituencies in which it was the 
incumbent party (i.e. had won these seats in the previous – in this case, 1998 – 
elections).  On the other hand, it won in 56 seats, and lost in 237 seats, in which it was 
a non-incumbent.  As a consequence, 136 seats changed hands between the INC and 
other parties
4.  This constituted an “electoral turnover” for the INC of  32 percent of  
the 423 seats it contested in 1999.  The INC, therefore, made a net loss of 24 seats
5
 
and these losses represented 18 percent of its total turnover of  136 seats.  
Table 1 shows that electoral turnover for the INC has always been high 
averaging 41 percent over the ten elections between 1967-99.  However, electoral 
turnover for the INC fell in the 1990s: it averaged 32 percent for the four elections in 
the period 1991-99 compared to 47 percent for the six elections in the 1967-89 period.  
This was due to the fact in the 1990s there was, relative to the number of seats 
contested by the INC, both a fall in the number of seats in which INC incumbents lost 
and in which INC non-incumbents won.  
In particular, with the sharp decline in the INC’s fortunes from the 1996 
election onwards – when its vote share in its contested seats fell to 25 percent - the 
proportion of INC incumbent seats in the total number of seats contested by the INC 
                                                                                                                                            
3
 In total, we made about 150 changes. 
4
 Wining non-incumbent (56) + losing incumbent seats (80). 
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fell sharply: in 1999, when the INC contested 423 seats, it was the incumbent party in 
132 seats and, of these, it contested 130; in 1998, when the INC contested 445 seats, it 
was the incumbent party in 126 seats and, of these, it contested 122.  By contrast, in 
the 1967 election, 260 out of the 474 seats contested by the INC were incumbent seats 
and, in 1996, when it had a large stock of incumbent seats (227) from 1991, 224 of the 
503 contested seats were incumbent seats. 
Along with a fall in the number of INC incumbent seats, both in absolute 
terms and as a proportion of seats contested, the chances of the INC losing a seat in 
which it was the incumbent increased dramatically since 1996: as Table 2 shows, in 
three successive elections, 1996, 1998 and 1999, the INC lost, respectively, 63, 48 
and 62 percent of its incumbent seats.  For attrition rates of comparable magnitude 
one has to go back to 1989 and, before that, to 1977, when, on a wave of anti-
Congress sentiment, the INC lost 65 (1989) and 75 (1977) percent of its incumbent 
seats.  Since the mid-1990s, however, attrition rates for incumbent INC seats have 
been high even in the absence of any overt anti-Congress feeling. 
Table 2 also shows that for four of the 10 elections in the 1967-99 period
6
, the 
risk ratio (the ratio of  the number of seats won by incumbents to seats lost by 
incumbents) for the INC was less than unity (i.e. the chance of the INC wining a seat 
in which it was an incumbent was less than the chance of losing it): in the 1996, 1998, 
and 1999 elections, the chance of the INC retaining a seat it held in the previous 
election was, at its best in the 1998 election, just over 50 percent.   
The odds ratio, , is the ratio of  the total number of seats won, to the total 
number of seats lost, by the INC.  The risk ratio (  ) is compared to the odds ratio 
                                                                                                                                            
5
 Wining non-incumbent (56) - losing incumbent seats (80). 
6
 1977, 1989, 1996, and 1999. 
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( ).  If the risk ratio is greater than the odds ratio (i.e. 1


 ), this meant that a party 
is more likely to have been the incumbent in a constituency if it won from that 
constituency than if it lost: ( | ) ( | )P A T P A T . Conversely, if the risk ratio is less 
than the odds ratio (i.e. 1


 ), then this meant that a party is more likely to have been 
the incumbent in a constituency if it lost, than if it won, from there: 
( | ) ( | )P A T P A T  7. 
Table 2 shows that, except for 1977 and 1989, the risk ratio was always 
greater than the odds ratio for the INC.  Even in the 1996 and 1999 elections, when it 
was very “risky” standing as an INC incumbent8, it was not as risky as standing as  an 
INC non-incumbent.  Consequently, in 1999, the likelihood of an INC win being an 
incumbent victory was almost twice as likely (risk ratio/odds ratio=1.91) as an INC 
loss being an incumbent defeat. Only in the 1977 and 1989 elections, both of which 
were characterised by a strong anti-INC sentiment, was it more risky being an INC 
incumbent compared to being an INC non-incumbent: in these elections: risk 
ratio/odds ratio<1 implied that the likelihood of an INC loss being an incumbent 
defeat was greater (by 25 percent in 1977 and 8 percent in 1989) than the likelihood 
of an INC win being an incumbent victory. 
4.  Inverse Risk Ratio and Inverse Odds Ratio Calculations for 
Indian Parliamentary (Lok Sabha) Elections  
Unlike Table 2, which compared the proportion of incumbent seat wins (of the 
seats contested by the INC as an incumbent party) to the proportion of incumbent seat 
losses, Table 3 compares the proportion of incumbent seat wins (of the number of 
                                                 
7
 Proof:  
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
P T A P A T P T P A T
P T A P A T P T P A T



     
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seats contested by the INC as an incumbent party) to the proportion of non-incumbent 
seats wins (of the number of seats contested by the INC as a non-incumbent party).  
Table 3 shows that, except for the elections of 1977 and 1989, the inverse risk ratio 
was always greater than 1 implying that the probability of the INC winning seats in 
which it was the incumbent was greater than the probability of the INC winning seats 
in which it was the non-incumbent: indeed, since 1991, the former probability has 
been more than twice as large as the latter probability.  
The inverse odds ratio,  , shown in Table 3 is the ratio of the total  number 
of seats which the INC contested as a non-incumbent party to the total number of 
seats it contested as an incumbent party.  When the sharp fall in the number of seats 
won by the INC since 1991 is combined with the considerably smaller fall in the 
number of seats contested by the INC, the INC emerges as a non-incumbent party in 
the majority of the seats contested by it: in consequence, the inverse odds ratio was 
greater than 1 for the post-1989 elections.  
The greater probability of the INC winning its incumbent, compared to its 
non-incumbent, seats (inverse risk ratio, 1  ) was set alongside the fact that, since 
1991, incumbent seats for the INC constituted a minority of the seats contested by it 
(inverse odds ratio, 1  ).  When the inverse risk ratio was greater than the inverse 
odds ratio ( 1


 ), the chance of an INC win being an incumbent victory was greater 
than the chance of it being a non-incumbent victory (1991 and 1996 elections): 
( | ) ( | )P A T P A T .  When the inverse risk ratio was less than the inverse odds ratio 
( 1


 ), the chance of an INC win being a non-incumbent victory was greater than 
                                                                                                                                            
8
 In 1999, for example, the probability of the INC losing a seat in which it was an incumbent was 62 
percent.  
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the chance of it being an incumbent victory (1998 and 1999 elections) 
( | ) ( | )P A T P A T .9   
5.  Comparison with the BJP 
Table 4 shows the electoral performance of the BJP which fought its first 
parliamentary elections in 1984 in which it won just 2 seats out of 223 seats contested 
in the 16 major states of India plus Delhi.  Since then its path has been steadily 
upward and in every subsequent election it has added to it tally of Lok Sabha 
Members: indeed,  it contested  the 1991 Lok Sabha elections with 80 incumbent Lok 
Sabha Members having won 81 seats (out of 214 contested) in the previous (1989) 
General Election.  In contrast to the INC, when the BJP contested 361 seats in 1998 it 
was the incumbent party in 159 seats and, of these, it contested 152; in 1999, when 
the BJP contested 313 seats, it was the incumbent party in 171 seats and, of these, it 
contested 168.  Thus over half the seats contested by the BJP, compared to less than a 
third of the seats contested by the INC, in the 1998 and 1999 election were seats in 
which they were the incumbent parties.   
Compared to the INC, the attrition rate in seats in which the BJP was the 
incumbent was much lower: as Table 5 shows, in three successive elections, 1996, 
1998 and 1999, the BJP lost, respectively, 28, 35 and 36 percent of its incumbent 
seats.   Table 5 also shows that the BJP was also much more likely to win an 
incumbent seat than to lose it: nearly three times as likely in 1996 (risk ratio=2.58) 
and almost twice as likely in the 1998 and 1999 elections (risk ratio=1.87 and 1.75, 
respectively).  The risk ratio was always greater than the odds ratio for the BJP: in the 
1991 and 1996 elections, the likelihood of an BJP win being an incumbent victory 
                                                 
9
 Proof: 
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
( | ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
P T A P A T P A P A T
P T A P A T P A P A T



     
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was over three  times as likely (


=3.26 and 4.69) as a BJP loss being an incumbent 
defeat. The fall in 


 for the BJP in 1999 was due to the fact that, for the first time in 
its brief electoral career of six General Elections, its number of wins was greater than 
its number of losses so that it odds ratio was greater than unity (odds raio=1.18).  
Consequently, the gap between the BJP's performance in its contested incumbent 
seats and in all its contested seats narrowed, leading to a fall in 


. 
Table 6 shows that the probability of the BJP winning seats in which it was the 
incumbent was substantially greater than the probability of the BJP winning seats in 
which it was the non-incumbent.  Because the BJP started from a very small base in 
1984, it was a non-incumbent party in the majority of the seats it contested: in 
consequence, the inverse odds ratio, like that for the INC, was greater than 1 for the 
post-1989 elections.
10
  Table 6 shows that in the 1989 and 1991 elections, the chance 
of a BJP win being a non-incumbent victory was greater than the chance of it being an 
incumbent victory ( 1


 );  for the 1996 election, the chance of a BJP win being a 
non-incumbent victory was about the same as the chance of it being an incumbent 
victory (


=1.02);  and, for the 1998 and 1999 elections, the chance of a BJP win 
being an incumbent victory was greater than the chance of it being a non-incumbent 
victory ( 1


 ). 
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6.  Close Finishes and Marginal Constituencies 
It could be argued that, when all the seats contested by the INC are analysed, 
INC incumbents are at an advantage over non-incumbents because they have “safer” 
constituencies: i.e. it would take a larger voter swing against the INC to defeat it in 
seats in which it was the incumbent than in seats in which it was not.  To examine the 
force of this argument we examined incumbent and non-incumbent performance in 
INC marginal constituencies.  
Table 7 shows the electoral performance of the INC in constituencies (in the 
16 major Indian states plus Delhi) in which there was a “close finish”, defined here as 
seats in which INC either came first or second with a margin of victory or defeat 
which was 10 percent or less of total valid votes
11
.  An important point which emerges 
from Table 7 is that, since 1989, the INC won a greater proportion of seats in which 
there was a close finish than it did of the total number of seats it contested: for 
example, in 1999 it won 106 percent of the 423 seats it contested (25 percent) and 68 
of the 177 seats it contested in which there was a close finish (38 percent).  However, 
in elections in which a pro-Congress wave swept away the opposition parties (1971, 
1980, and 1984), the INC won a much larger proportion of the total number of seats it 
contested than it did of constituencies in which there was a close finish. 
An important criterion of effective electoral performance is to win marginal 
seats and, indeed, to convert marginal constituencies into party strongholds.  
Conversely, ineffective electoral performance would be to lose marginal seats and, 
indeed, to allow opposition parties to convert marginal constituencies into party 
strongholds.  The relevant question is whether the effective electoral performance of 
                                                                                                                                            
10
 However, in the 1999 elections, the BJP was the incumbent party in the majority of seats in which it 
contested and its odds ratio was less than 1. 
11
 That is, a 5 percent swing from the winner to the loser would have altered the result. 
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the INC was helped or hindered by it being the incumbent party in marginal 
constituencies. 
We define a constituency as being an INC “marginal constituency” for a 
particular election if, in the previous election,  the INC either came first or second in 
that constituency with a margin of victory or defeat which was 10 percent or less of 
total valid votes.  Then, for the current election, this opens up four possibilities: 
(i) the INC wins the seat and converts it from a marginal to a non-marginal 
constituency with a winning margin which exceeds 10 percent of the total 
of valid votes.  We awarded 3 points for each constituency in which the 
INC achieved this. 
(ii)  the INC wins the seat but it remains a marginal constituency i.e. the 
winning margin did not exceed 10 percent of the total of valid votes. We 
awarded 2 points for each constituency in which the INC achieved this. 
(iii) the INC loses the seat but it remains a marginal constituency i.e. the losing 
margin did not exceed 10 percent of the total of valid votes. We awarded 1 
point for each constituency in which the INC achieved this. 
(iv) the INC loses the seat and converts it from a marginal to a non-marginal 
constituency with a losing margin which exceeds 10 percent of the total of 
valid votes.  We awarded 0 points for each constituency in which the INC 
achieved this. 
These values (3, 2, 1, 0) may be termed the marginal constituencies 
performance (MCP) scores of a party.  Table 8 shows the MCP profile of the INC, 
separately for constituencies in which it was the incumbent and those in which it was 
the challenger, in the various Lok Sabha elections held during 1967-99.  In 1999, for 
example, the INC contested 311 marginal seats.  These were seats which, in the 
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previous (1998) election, the INC won (84 seats) or came second (227), with a margin 
of 10 percent or less of the total valid votes.   
In the 1999 elections, of the 84 marginal seats in which the INC was the 
incumbent: it won 2 percent with a margin of more than 10 percent (3 points); it won 
26 percent with a margin of 10 percent or less (2 points); it lost 50 percent with a 
margin of 10 percent or less (1 points); and it lost 21 percent with a margin of more 
than 10 percent (0 points). Its average score over these 84 seats was 1.1.  In contrast, 
of the 227 marginal seats in which the INC was the main challenger: it won 6 percent 
with a margin of more than 10 percent (3 points); it won 8 percent with a margin of 10 
percent or less (2 points); it lost 62 percent with a margin of 10 percent or less (1 
points); and it lost 23 percent with a margin of more than 10 percent (0 points). Its 
average score over these 227 seats was 0.97.   
Table 8 also shows the mean value of the MCP scores for the INC computed 
across all the marginal constituencies in which it was the incumbent (i.e. 
constituencies it won with a margin of 10 percent or less in the previous election) and 
(parenthetically) across all the marginal constituencies in which it was the main 
challenger (i.e. constituencies in which, in the previous election, it came second, 
losing by a margin of 10 percent or less).  The maximum possible mean score, for the 
INC, as incumbent or as challenger, is 3 and the minimum is 0.  
Table 8 shows that the INC’s performance in marginal seats was particularly 
good in the “Congress wave” elections of 1971, 1980, and 1984 and particularly bad 
in the post-Emergency elections of 1977.  For the three elections of 1996, 1998, and 
1999, the INC’s performance in marginal seats has been much worse than in earlier 
elections: in 1999, for example, it lost over 70 percent of the marginal constituencies 
in which it was the incumbent and it lost over 80 percent of the marginal 
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constituencies in which it was the challenger.  Through all these fluctuations in the 
level of the INC’s performance in its marginal seats one fact stands out: its 
performance (as measured by the mean MCP score) in seats in which it was the 
incumbent was, except for 1989, always better than its performance in seats in which 
it was the challenger.  
An interesting feature that emerges from Table 8 is the dramatic increase in 
the number of marginal seats contested by the INC.  In the 1967 elections, 157 of the 
474 seats contested by the INC (33 percent) were marginal seats (i.e. it was defending 
or attacking a winning margin of 10 percent or less); in the 1999 elections, 311 of the 
423 seats contested by the INC (74 percent) were marginal seats and, of these, the 
INC was contesting 84 constituencies as the incumbent party and 227 as a non-
incumbent challenger.     
7.  Vote Shares and Incumbency 
Table 9 shows the mean votes share obtained (percentage of valid votes) by 
the INC in constituencies which it contested as the incumbent, and as a non-
incumbent, party. Except for the two elections of 1977 and 1989, the INC's vote share 
in seats in which it was the incumbent was greater than its vote share in seats in which 
it was a non-incumbent.  Similarly, as Table 10 shows, the BJP's vote share in its 
incumbent seats was always greater than its vote share in seats in which it was a non-
incumbent.   
If we compare incumbent and non-incumbent vote shares in constituencies in 
which the parties won then, as Tables 9 and 10 show, the INC and BJP mean vote 
shares in their incumbent seat wins was larger than their vote shares in their non-
incumbent seat wins (except, significantly, for the 1989 and 1996 elections for the 
INC). If, however, we compare incumbent and non-incumbent vote shares in 
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constituencies in which the parties lost then, as Table 9 shows, the difference between 
the vote shares received by the INC in its losing incumbent and non-incumbent seats 
was generally positive.  However, as Table 10 shows, there was a much larger 
positive gap between the vote shares received by the BJP in its losing incumbent and 
non-incumbent seats.  
The issue of vote shares, and of the effectiveness of mobilising votes so as to 
increase these shares, can be analysed using econometric methods. Let Y be a variable 
such that Yi=1 if a party wins from constituency i and Yi=0 if the party loses from the 
constituency.  Let I be a variable such that Ii=1 if a party is the incumbent party in 
constituency i and Ii=0 if it is a non-incumbent party. If  Vi is the vote share 
(percentage received of valid votes) of the party in constituency i, then the probability 
of a party winning the seat can be represented (in logit form) - separately for 
incumbent and non-incumbent constituencies - as an increasing function of its vote 
share:  
 1 2
Pr( 1
log ( ) ([1 ] )
Pr( 0
i
i i i i i
i
Y
I V I V u
Y
 
 
      
 
 (1) 
for a logistic error tern, ui.  The coefficients 1 and 2 relate to constituencies in which 
the party is, respectively, the incumbent and a non-incumbent. From equation (1), the 
probability of winning constituency i is:  
 1 2
1 2
exp{ ( ) ([1 ] )}
Pr( 1)
1 exp{ ( ) ([1 ] )}
i i i i
i i
i i i i
I V I V
p Y
I V I V
 
 
   
  
    
 (2) 
 
and the marginal probability with respect to the vote share, Vi, is the change in pi 
resulting from a percentage point change in the vote share: ie. the marginal 
probability = i
i
p
V


.   
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 Table 10 shows the estimated marginal probabilities for the INC for seats 
which it contested as incumbent and non-incumbent parties.  The marginal 
probabilities may be interpreted as the effectiveness of vote mobilisation for the party 
because they measure how the probability of a party winning increased with an extra 
point increase in its vote share. If 1=2, there is no difference in the effectiveness of 
vote mobilisation between constituencies in which a party is the incumbent and those 
in which it is a non-incumbent; on the other hand,  if 1>2 (1<2), vote mobilisation 
is relatively more (less) effective in incumbent, compared to  non-incumbent, 
constituencies.    
 If the probability of winning is taken to range from 0 to 100, then Table 10 
shows that, in 1967, an increase of 1 point in the INC’s vote share would, on average, 
have increased the probability of its winning a constituency in which it was the 
incumbent by 2.9 points and of its winning a constituency in which it was a non-
incumbent by 2.7 points.  Given the standard errors associated with the marginal 
probabilities, this difference was not significantly different from zero at the 5% level.   
So, for the INC in the 1967 elections (and, indeed, in all the elections between 1967-
99 except for the 1984, 1989, 1991 and 1996 elections) the effectiveness of vote 
mobilisation did not differ between its incumbent and non-incumbent seats.  For the 
1984, 1989, 1991 and 1996 elections, however, resources spent by the INC in 
mobilising votes in incumbent seats would have been more effective (in terms of 
increasing the probability of winning) than a corresponding outlay of resources in 
seats where it was a non-incumbent.  
In the elections of 1991 and 1996, when, as Table 12 shows, the BJP received a 
considerably smaller vote share in constituencies in which it was a non-incumbent 
compared to seats where it was the incumbent, resources spent by the BJP in 
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mobilising votes in incumbent seats would have been more effective (in terms of 
increasing the probability of winning) than a corresponding outlay of resources in 
seats where it was a non-incumbent. However, in the 1998 and 1999 elections, with a 
narrowing of the gap between the BJP’s vote share in incumbent and non-incumbent 
seats, the effectiveness of vote mobilisation by the BJP did not differ significantly 
between the two types of constituencies. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
On the face of it, there did appear to be an anti-incumbency factor working against 
the INC  from the 1996 elections onwards: in the 1998 elections, the INC lost in 
nearly half, and in the 1996 and 1999 elections the INC lost in nearly two-thirds, of 
the constituencies in which it was the incumbent party.  However, the fact that from 
the 1996 election onwards the INC had, at best, a 50-50 chance of being elected from 
seats which it held in the previous election reflected not so much anti-incumbency 
towards the INC but, rather, a general worsening of the party’s fortunes.  For 
example, in the 1996 elections, the INC had a 15 percent chance of winning in seats in 
which it was a non-incumbent compared to a 38 percent chance of winning in seats in 
which it was the incumbent.  
One way of assessing the extent of anti-incumbency sentiment towards the INC 
was to set the electoral performance of the INC as an incumbent party alongside its 
general electoral performance (i.e. the ratio of incumbent wins to losses to total wins 
to total losses). The risk and odds ratio calculations shown in Table 2 revealed that, 
even in the 1996 and in the 1999 elections, the chances of an INC win being an 
incumbent victory were almost twice as great the chances of an INC loss being an 
incumbent defeat. So, on this measure, there was no anti-incumbency sentiment 
towards the INC.  
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Another way of assessing the extent of anti-incumbency sentiment towards the 
INC was to set the electoral success of the INC as an incumbent party and non-
incumbent party alongside the representation of incumbents and non-incumbents in 
the total number of seats contested by the INC.  The inverse risk ratio and inverse 
odds ratio calculations shown in Table 3 revealed that in the 1998 and 1999 elections, 
the chances of  an INC win being a non-incumbent victory were greater than the 
chances of an INC win being an incumbent victory.  So, on this measure, and for 
these elections, there was anti-incumbency sentiment towards the INC. 
A third way of assessing the extent of incumbency bias against the INC was to 
examine its electoral performance in its marginal seats both as an incumbent party and 
as the main challenger. The marginal constituencies performance score proposed in 
this paper showed that the INC performed better in its marginal seats when it was the 
incumbent party than when it was the main challenger. 
Lastly, we examined the vote shares for the INC in seats in which it was the 
incumbent party and in seats in which it was the challenger.  This showed that 
winning INC incumbents had larger vote shares than winning INC non-incumbents 
and that losing INC incumbents had larger vote shares than losing INC non-
incumbents.  Furthermore, there was some evidence that an increase in INC vote 
share in a constituency would be more effective (in terms of increasing its  probability 
of winning an election) when it was the incumbent in that constituency than when it 
was not the incumbent.    
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Table 1 
Lok Sabha Election Performance of the Indian National Congress (INC) 
 Winning 
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Winning 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing  
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Seats Won: 
Contested 
Electoral 
Turnover 
(%) 
Seats 
Gain/Loss 
Seats Gain/ 
Loss as % of  
Seats 
Change  
1967 
(54) 
91 96 164 123 255:474 39 -5 0.2 
1971 
(78) 
116 45 196 41 312:398 40 71 44 
1977 
(30) 
72 209 69 115 141:465 60 -137 49 
1980 
(82) 
223 10 115 123 338:471 49 213 91 
1984 
(80) 
120 52 278 46 398:496 35 68 40 
1989 
(37) 
46 247 133 55 179:481 61 -201 -69 
1991 
(47) 
94 44 133 208 227:479 29 50 36 
1996 
(25) 
42 140 84 237 126:503 36 -98 -54 
1998 
(30) 
69 59 63 254 132:445 29 10 8 
1999 
(25) 
56 80 50 237 106:423 32 -24 -18 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the INC. 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of seats won by the INC of those it contested.  
Electoral Turnover: percentage of seats contested by INC which changed hands between INC and other 
parties. 
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Table 2 
Risk Ratio and Odds Ratio Calculations for the Indian National Congress 
Lok Sabha Elections  
 % of seats 
contested by 
incumbent, won 
by incumbent   
% seats 
contested by 
incumbent, lost 
by incumbent 
Risk 
Ratio
*
 
Odds 
Ratio
**
 
Risk Ratio 
/ Odds 
Ratio 
1967 
(54) 
57.1 42.9 1.33 1.16 1.15 
1971 
(78) 
81.3 18.7 4.35 3.63 1.20 
1977 
(30) 
24.8 75.2 0.33 0.44 0.75 
1980 
(72) 
82.0 8.0 11.50 2.54 4.53 
1984 
(80) 
84.2 15.8 5.35 4.06 1.32 
1989 
(37) 
35.0 65.0 0.54 0.59 0.92 
1991 
(48) 
75.1 24.9 3.02 0.90 3.36 
1996 
(25) 
37.5 62.5 0.60 0.33 1.82 
1998 
(30) 
51.6 48.4 1.07 0.42 2.55 
1999 
(25) 
38.5 61.5 0.63 0.33 1.91 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the INC. 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of seats won by the INC of those it contested 
*
Risk Ratio = Number of seats contested by incumbents which were won by incumbents/ Number of 
seats contested by incumbents which were lost by incumbents 
** Odds Ratio = Number of seats won to number of seats lost, by INC 
 
 
  21 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Inverse Risk Ratio and Inverse Odds Ratio Calculations for the Indian National 
Congress: Lok Sabha Elections 
 % of seats 
contested by 
incumbent, won 
by incumbent   
% seats 
contested by 
non-incumbent, 
won by non-
incumbent 
Inverse 
Risk 
Ratio
*
 
Inverse 
Odds 
Ratio
**
 
Inverse 
Risk Ratio 
/ Inverse 
Odds 
Ratio 
Factor 
1967 
(61) 
57.1 48.7 1.17 0.64 1.80 
1971 
(61) 
81.3 73.9 1.10 0.64 1.69 
1977 
(58) 
24.8 38.5 0.64 0.67 0.95 
1980 
(27) 
92.0 64.5 1.43 2.78 0.51 
1984 
(66) 
84.2 72.3 1.16 0.50 2.31 
1989 
(79) 
35.0 45.5 0.77 0.27 2.90 
1991 
(37) 
75.1 31.1 2.41 1.69 1.42 
1996 
(45) 
37.5 15.1 2.48 1.25 3.10 
1998 
(27) 
51.6 21.4 2.41 2.63 0.92 
1999 
(31) 
38.5 19.1 2.02 2.27 0.89 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the INC. 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of INC incumbent seats of total INC contested seats 
*
Inverse Risk Ratio = % of seats contested by incumbents which were won by incumbents / % of seats 
contested by non-incumbents which were won by non-incumbents 
**
 Inverse Odds Ratio = Ratio of the number of non-incumbents to incumbents 
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Table 4 
Lok Sabha Election Performance of the Bharatiya Janata Party  (BJP) 
 Winning 
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Winning 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing  
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Seats Won: 
Contested 
Electoral 
Turnover 
(%) 
Seats 
Gain/Loss 
Seats Gain/ 
Loss as % 
of  Seats 
Change  
1989 
(38) 
80 1 1 132 81:214 38 80 99 
1991 
(25) 
73 38 42 302 115:455 24 35 32 
1996 
(35) 
79 31 80 259 159:449 25 48 44 
1998 
(47) 
72 53 99 137 171:361 35 19 15 
1999 
(54) 
63 61 107 83 170:314 40 2 2 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the BJP. 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of seats won by the BJP of those it contested.  
Electoral Turnover: percentage of seats contested by BJP which changed hands between BJP and other 
parties. 
 
  23 
 
 
Table 5 
Risk Ratio and Odds Ratio Calculations for Lok Sabha Candidates of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party  (BJP) 
 % of seats 
contested by 
incumbent, won 
by incumbent   
% seats contested 
by incumbent, lost 
by incumbent 
Risk Ratio
*
 Odds 
Ratio
**
 
Risk Ratio 
/ Odds 
Ratio 
1989 
(38) 
50 50 1 0.61 1.64 
1991 
(25) 
52.5 47.5 1.11 0.34 3.26 
1996 
(35) 
72.1 27.9 2.58 0.55 4.69 
1998 
(47) 
65.1 34.9 1.87 0.90 2.08 
1999 
(54) 
63.7 36.3 1.75 1.18 1.48 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the BJP. 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of seats won by the BJP of those it contested. 
*
Risk Ratio = Number of seats contested by incumbents which were won by incumbents/ Number of 
seats contested by incumbents which were lost by incumbents 
** Odds Ratio = Number of seats won to number of seats lost, by BJP 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Inverse Risk Ratio and Inverse Odds Ratio Calculations for Lok Sabha 
Candidates of the Bharatiya Janata Party  (BJP) 
 % of seats 
contested by 
incumbent, won 
by incumbent   
% seats contested 
by non-
incumbent, won 
by non-incumbent 
Inverse 
Risk Ratio
*
 
Inverse 
Odds 
Ratio
**
 
Inverse 
Risk ratio / 
Inverse 
Odds Ratio 
1989 
(1) 
50.0 37.7 1.33 111.1 0.01 
1991 
(18) 
52.5 19.5 2.69 4.76 0.56 
1996 
(25) 
72.1 23.4 3.08 3.03 1.02 
1998 
(42) 
65.1 34.5 1.89 1.37 1.38 
1999 
(54) 
63.7 43.2 1.47 0.87 1.69 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the BJP. 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of BJP incumbent seats of total BJP contested seats 
*
Inverse Risk Ratio = % of seats contested by incumbents which were won by incumbents / % of seats 
contested by non-incumbents which were won by non-incumbents 
**
 Inverse Odds Ratio = Ratio of the number of non-incumbents to incumbents 
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Table 7 
Lok Sabha Election Performance of the Indian National Congress (INC)  
in Close Finishes
*
 
 Winning 
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Winning 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing  
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Seats Won: 
Contested 
Electoral 
Turnover 
(%) 
Seats 
Gain/Loss 
Seats Gain/ 
Loss as % of  
Seats 
Change  
1967 
(54) 
45 48 60 41 105:194 48 -3 3 
1971 
(55) 
25 23 25 18 50:91 53 2 4 
1977 
(49) 
16 24 19 13 35:72 56 -8 20 
1980 
(60) 
67 6 11 47 78:131 56 61 84 
1984 
(60) 
27 25 56 31 83:139 37 2 4 
1989 
(48) 
25 69 57 21 82:172 55 -44 47 
1991 
(51) 
46 28 50 64 96:188 39 18 24 
1996 
(44) 
24 55 54 45 78:178 44 -31 39 
1998 
(52) 
45 29 39 50 84:163 45 16 22 
1999 
(38) 
34 50 34 59 68:177 47 -16 19 
*
Margin of victory or defeat was 10 percent or less of total valid votes. 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the INC. 
Figures in parentheses are percentage of seats won by the INC of those it contested.  
Electoral Turnover: percentage of seats contested by INC which changed hands between INC and other 
parties. 
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Table 8 
Marginal Constituencies Performance Profiles and Scores: 
Lok Sabha Elections, Indian National Congress 
 Percentage of Constituencies with Score    
 Score=3 Score=2 Score=1 Score=0 Average 
Score 
Number of 
Marginal 
Seats 
1967 28.1 
(21.3) 
27.1 
(26.2) 
18.8 
(26.2) 
26.0 
(26.2) 
1.57 
(1.43) 
96 
(61) 
1971 60.0 
(47.4) 
16.2 
(6.2) 
13.3 
(20.6) 
10.5 
(25.8) 
2.26 
(1.75) 
105 
(97) 
1977 8.2 
(11.1) 
12.2 
(4.8) 
8.2 
(7.9) 
71.4 
(76.2) 
0.57 
(0.51) 
49 
(63) 
1980 56.3 
(58.3) 
15.6 
(12.5) 
18.8 
(8.3) 
9.4 
(20.8) 
2.19 
(2.08) 
32 
(48) 
1984 61.3 
(65.4) 
21.3 
(7.8) 
8.8 
(15.4) 
8.8 
(11.5) 
2.35 
(2.27) 
80 
(78) 
1989 15.2 
(19.1) 
22.8 
(20.6) 
22.8 
(27.0) 
39.2 
(33.3) 
1.14 
(1.25) 
79 
(63) 
1991 27.9 
(17.5) 
32.6 
(13.2) 
26.7 
(43.0) 
12.8 
(26.3) 
1.76 
(1.22) 
86 
(114) 
1996 8.3 
(7.6) 
24.0 
(12.4) 
37.5 
(55.9) 
30.2 
(24.1) 
1.10 
(1.03) 
96 
(145) 
1998 12.8 
(7.0) 
38.5 
(14.1) 
32.1 
(54.3) 
16.7 
(24.6) 
1.47 
(1.04) 
78 
(199) 
1999 2.4 
(6.2) 
26.2 
(8.4) 
50.0 
(62.1) 
21.4 
(23.4) 
1.10 
(0.97) 
84 
(227) 
For a given election, a constituency is a marginal constituency for the INC if, in the previous election, 
the INC won or lost the seat with a margin of 10 percent or less of the total valid votes. 
Figures in the first line refer to marginal constituencies in which the INC is the incumbent. 
Figures in the second line (shown parenthetically) refer to marginal constituencies in which the INC is 
the challenger. 
Score=3: the INC wins the seat with a margin which exceeds 10 percent of the total of valid votes. 
Score=2: the INC wins the seat with a margin which does not exceed 10 percent of the total of valid 
votes. 
Score=1: the INC loses the seat with a margin which does not exceed 10 percent of the total of valid 
votes. 
Score=0: the INC loses the seat with a margin which exceeds 10 percent of the total of valid votes. 
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Table 9 
Vote Shares of Indian National Congress (INC) Candidates in Lok Sabha 
Elections 
 Mean Vote Shares in: 
 Incumbent 
Seats 
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Winning 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Winning 
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing  
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
1967  
(40.1) 
40.7 39.2 
 
45.0 43.7 34.9 34.9 
1971  
(52.4) 
54.6 
 
48.2 
 
58.9 52.9 36.2 35.0 
1977  
(36.9) 
37.3 
 
40.7 
 
56.7 56.9 30.8 30.5 
1980 
(47.5)  
56.4 
 
42.8 
 
57.8 48.5 40.6 32.6 
1984  
(51.5) 
52.8 
 
48.9 
 
55.3 52.4 39.2 39.6 
1989  
(39.6) 
39.2 
 
43.7 49.6 52.2 33.6 36.6 
1991 
(41.4)  
47.0 
 
33.4 
 
51.2 47.0 34.1 27.2 
1996  
(31.9) 
35.3 
 
23.7 
 
44.5 46.7 29.8 19.8 
1998  
(34.6) 
41.2 
 
25.1 
 
48.4 47.9 33.5 19.0 
1999 
(39.2)  
42.2 
 
30.6 
 
47.3 47.0 39.0 26.7 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the INC. 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Vote Shares of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Lok Sabha Elections 
 Median Vote Shares in: 
 Incumbent 
Seats 
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Winning 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Winning 
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing 
Incumbent 
Seats 
Losing  
Non-
Incumbent 
Seats 
1989  
(28.2) 
49.7 28.5 59.2 51.1 40.3 14.8 
1991 
(25.9)  
42.5 20.9 48.1 40.9 36.3 16.0 
1996  
(28.9) 
41.4 21.0 44.6 42.3 33.1 14.5 
1998  
(39.0) 
43.9 31.5 46.6 44.0 38.9 25.0 
1999 
(42.1)  
43.0 37.0 48.5 47.5 33.4 29.1 
Results pertain to the 16 major Indian states plus Delhi. 
Incumbency refers to seats held by the BJP. 
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Table 11 
Marginal Probabilities of the Indian National Congress (INC)  
Winning Seats in Lok Sabha Elections 
 Number 
obs 
Pseudo-R
2
 Marginal Probability 
in Incumbent Seats 
Marginal Probability 
in Non-Incumbent 
Seats 
Test of: 1=2 
[2(1)] 
1967 474 0.175 0.029 
(8.90) 
0.027 
(8.25 
2.24 
1971 398 0.458 0.013 
(6.22) 
0.013 
(5.95) 
.016 
1977 465 0.868 0.002 
(1.21) 
0.002 
(1.20) 
2.02 
1980 471 0.524 0.026 
(8.11) 
0.028 
(7.43) 
2.75 
1984 495 0.398 0.018 
(7.75) 
0.017 
(7.29) 
4.59
*
 
1989 481 0.516 0.052 
(11.06) 
0.049 
(11.30) 
4.42
*
 
1991 479 0.502 0.0519 
(10.90) 
0.046 
(10.14) 
13.77
*
 
1996 503 0.499 0.010 
(4.41) 
0.009 
(4.46) 
12.66
*
 
1998 445 0.563 0.007 
(3.06) 
0.006 
(3.10) 
1.13 
1999 423 0.338 0.014 
(6.46) 
0.013 
(6.57) 
0.57 
The marginal probability is the change in the probability of winning a constituency, consequent upon a 
1 percentage point increase in the party's vote share in that constituency 
 
 
Table 12 
Marginal Probabilities of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
of Winning Seats in Lok Sabha Elections  
 Number 
obs 
Pseudo-R
2
 Marginal Probability 
in Incumbent Seats 
Marginal Probability 
in Non-Incumbent 
Seats 
Test of: 1=2 
[2(1)] 
1991 455 0.528 0.010 
(5.02) 
0.011 
(4.10) 
7.13
*
 
1996 449 0.570 0.024 
(7.31) 
0.022 
(7.74) 
3.84
*
 
1998 361 0.365 0.043 
(9.72) 
0.042 
(8.97) 
0.17 
1999 314 0.421 0.047 
(9.13) 
0.044 
(8.62) 
3.20 
The marginal probability is the change in the probability of winning a constituency, consequent upon a 
1 percentage point increase in the party's vote share in that constituency   
 
